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Abstract
Let P be a set of participants sharing a secret from a set of secrets. A secret sharing scheme is a protocol such
that any qualified subset of P can determine the secret by pooling their shares, the messages which they receive,
without error, whereas non-qualified subsets of P cannot obtain any knowledge about the secret when they pool
what they receive. In (optimal) schemes, the sizes of shared secrets depend on the sizes of shares given to the
participants. Namely the former grow up exponentially as the latter increase exponentially. In this paper, instead
of determining the secret, we require the qualified subsets of participants to identify the secret. This change would
certainly make no difference from determining secret if no error for identification were allowed. So here we relax
the requirement to identification such that an error may occur with a vanishing probability as the sizes of the secrets
grow up. Under relaxed condition this changing allows us to share a set of secrets with double exponential size as
the sizes of shares received by the participants exponentially grow. Thus much longer secret can be shared. On the
other hand, by the continuity of Shannon entropy we have that the relaxation makes no difference for (ordinary)
secret sharing schemes. We obtain the characterizations of relations of sizes of secrets and sizes of the shares
for identification secret sharing schemes without and with public message. Our idea originates from Ahlswede-
Dueck’s awarded work in 1989, where the identification codes via channels were introduced.
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1. Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a method of sharing a secret s from a finite set S of secrets among a finite
set P of the participants in such a way that only so-called qualified subsets of P are able to reconstruct
s whereas any other subsets of P should know absolutely nothing about s. To do this for a given s ∈ S,
the dealer, a special participant who is not in P and observes the secret s, distributes the “shares”,
messages chosen according to certain probability, to the participants in P . A subset of the participants in
P try to reconstruct s, by pooling their shares which they receive from the dealer. The subsets of P are
distinguished to qualified and non-qualified subsets. The qualified subsets should be able to reconstruct
s (without error) whereas the non-qualified subsets should have no knowledge about s. The collection of
qualified subsets is called access structure. Such a scheme usually called perfect secret sharing scheme.
In this paper we only consider this kind of schemes and simply call them secret sharing schemes.
The first secret sharing schemes, (k,m) threshold schemes, were introduced by G. R. Blakley [4] and
A. Shamir [10] independently. They proved that to share a set of secrets with size q it is sufficient to give
every participant log q bits, where q is a power of a prime not smaller than k, and here and throughout
the paper the bases of all logarithms are 2. In a (k,m) threshold scheme, the cardinality of set S of
participants is m and a subset A of participants is qualified iff |A|  k. The schemes are optimal in the
sense that for fixed size |S|, the information which each participant has to receive is the least possible.
Actually it is easy to show in any secret sharing scheme, every participant must receive at least log |S|
bits share. Such a secret sharing scheme is called ideal.
The ideal secret sharing scheme does not always exist. (Please c. f. [5] for the conditions of existence
of ideal secret sharing schemes in terms of matroid and [6] for examples where the ideal secret sharing
scheme does not exist). However, for any access structure there exists a constant c such that it is sufficient
to give each participant at most c log |S| bits in an optimal scheme. That is, the sizes of shares given to
the participants exponentially increase when the sizes of secrets shared are exponentially increase.
The model of identification via channels was introduced by R. Ahlswede and G. Dueck [2] based
on the following fact. In many cases, the receivers of channels only are interested in whether a special
message was sent but not in which message was sent (and the senders do not know which message they
are interested in). For example, a man was injured in an accident on a high way. The people whose
relatives were driving on the high way only want to know if the poor man is their relatives. If not, they
do not care who he is. The behaviors of transmission and identification via channels are very different.
The well known Shannon Theorem [11] says that an optimal transmission code of length n carries
asymptotically nC bits of information whereas it was shown in [2] that with an optimal identification
code asymptotic 2nC bits of information can be identified. Here C is the well known Shannon capacity.
That means that the identification can be much faster done than transmission. So far the coding problem
for the identification via channels has become a important and fruitful area in information theory. (For
example, see [7] and [12]). A recent work by R. Ahlswede [1] provided many new ideas, problems, and
results related identification. This opened a new area of the theory of information transfer.
We observe that similar things may happen in the secret sharing. Sometimes a subset of participants
may be interested only in whether the dealer’s secret is a special one but not in what it is. In other words,
instead to reconstruct it, they want to identify it. We represent such an example at the beginning of the
Section 3. It is no hard to see that there is no difference between reconstruction and identification of the
secrets in the error free case. So here we allow an error of identification to occur with arbitrarily small
probability (for a sufficiently large size of secrets). We shall see that under this relaxation, a “secret
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sharing scheme” for that the qualified subsets identify the secret, which will be called an identification
secret sharing scheme, can “share” much more secrets than an ordinary secret sharing scheme for that
the qualified subsets have to reconstruct the secret. More specifically, we show that a set of secrets with
double exponential size can be identified if the size of shares given to the participants exponentially
increases. Thus much more secrets can be shared. On the other hand, by the continuity of Shannon
entropy, one can show the same relaxation makes no difference for the ordinary secret sharing schemes.
Our results are very similar to that in [3] in the following two points. (Please c. f. [3] or [1] for the
details.)
- The (optimal) second order information rate for identification does not equal to the first order infor-
mation rate for reconstruction.
- The rate of identification is equal to the size of common randomness.
In fact a hashing idea there is used by us to construct the identification secret sharing scheme.
We also consider the case in that the public message is allowed. That is, the dealer’s message divided
to two parts, public message, which is broadcasted to all participants, and secret messages, or shares
which are distributed to each participant privately. We show that the sizes of shares given by dealer are
independent of the sizes of shared secrets if the quantity of public message is unlimited.
In the next section we present the necessary background of secret sharing schemes. Our models and re-
sults are stated in Section 3. The converse and direct theorems are proved in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2. Background
In this section, let us briefly review the definition of the secret sharing scheme. A few equivalent
definitions have been given by the different authors. We present here a definition in terms of Shannon
entropy [9], [6]. The other definitions, for example, can be found in [13]. We set this section for the
readers without background of secret sharing schemes. For the readers, who are familiar with definition
of secret sharing scheme, may skip it and directly read the next section after reading the next paragraph
for our notation.
Denote by [J ] := {1, . . . , J }, for a positive integer J and XA := Xj1 × Xj2 × . . .× Xjl for A :={j1, j2, . . . jl} ⊂ [J ] (j1  j2 . . .  jl) and a given collection of finite sets X1, . . . ,XJ . Analogously
we define XA by XA := (Xj1, . . . , Xjl ) for a given sequence of random variables (RV) (X1, . . . , XJ ).
We also write a sequence in XA as xA, X j := X[j ], and Xj := X[j ] and so on. Moreover the probability
distribution of RV Y and its conditional distribution under the condition that RV Z is given are denoted
by PY and PY |Z respectively. A collection A of subsets of a finite set P is monotone or an upset if
A ⊃ B ∈ A implies A ∈ A.
Let S be a finite set, the set of secrets. A set of participants sharing a secret from S is a finite set
P := [J ]. In this paper for the simplicity of the notation, an integer j ∈ [J ], instead of Pj , stands for
the j th participant in P . An access structure A on P is a monotone collection of subsets in P . A subset
A ⊂ P is called qualified iff A ∈ A and otherwise A is non-qualified. A useful fact is that a monotone
collection A of subsets is determined by the collection of its minimal subsets, A0 := {A : A ∈ A and
there is no A′ ∈ A with A′ ⊂ A}. A secret sharing scheme is a way to distribute messages, the so-
called shares, according to a secret s ∈ S such that the members of a qualified subset of P are able to
reconstruct s by pooling the shares which they receive whereas the members of a non-qualified subsets
have absolutely no knowledge about s when they pool what they receive. The distribution is done by a
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special participant, the dealer, who is not in P . The secret sharing scheme can be defined in terms of
Shannon entropy as follows.
For given a secret source, a RV S taking values in a finite set S of secrets, a setP = [J ] of participants,
and an access structure A, a secret sharing scheme is specified by a stochastic matrix W : S −→ X J
(a conditional probability distribution over a J -dimension cartesian product of finite sets Xj , j ∈ [J ],
under the condition that the secret S = s is given) such that
i) For all A ∈ A,
H(S|XA) = 0, (1)
ii) For all A /∈ A,
H(S|XA) = H(S), (2)
where X J := X1 × . . .× XJ for arbitrary finite sets Xj , j ∈ [J ] and (say) P := [J ], H(.) and H(.|.)
are entropy and conditional entropy respectively, and XJ := (X1, . . . , XJ ) be the RV introduced by
PS ×W i.e., for all s ∈ S and xJ ∈ X J , PSXJ (s, xJ ) = PS(s)W(xJ |s). Let us call (X1, . . . ,XJ ) (Xj )
the alphabet of P (the participant j ) for W . Notice that condition i) is equivalent to that the support sets
supp(PXA|S(.|s)) := {xA : PXA|S(xA|s) > 0, xA ∈ XA}, s ∈ S are pairwise disjoint or in other words
for any xA ∈ XA there is at most one s ∈ S with PXA|S(xA|s) > 0 for all A ∈ A. Condition ii) is equiv-
alent to that S and XA are independent i. e., for all A /∈ A, s ∈ S and xA ∈ XA
PS|XA(s|xA) = PS(s). (3)
For given a W , the scheme works as follows. The dealer, who wants to share a secret s ∈ S, chooses
xJ ∈ X J randomly according to the conditional distribution W(xJ |s) and distributes the “shares”, the
message xj , j = 1, . . . , J to the participant j ∈ P privately, (i.e. gives the participant j the message
xj ). After receiving the shares, a subset A of participants pool their shares xj , j ∈ A to obtain a se-
quence xA ∈ XA and try to reconstruct s from xA. In the case that A ∈ A, there is unique s′ ∈ S with
PXA|S(xA|s′) > 0 and so they know with probability one that s = s′. On the other hand, (2) implies that
xA may not give any information about the secret if A ∈ A.
The assumption of monotonicity of the access structure is necessary because the condition i) implies
that for a “non-monotone access structure” a secret sharing scheme never exists. On the other hand it
was shown in [8] that secret sharing schemes exist for all (monotone) access structures. Without loss of
generality, we assume that there is no participant j ∈ P with {j} ∈ A (since we can simply give such
a participant the complete secret S = s) nor with {j} ∪ A /∈ A for all A ⊂ P (since in this case we can
simply give nothing to such a j ). We also assume that in the sequel all considered secret sources S have
PS(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S (since we can simply remove the secret of zero probability from S). Then it is
easy to show that for any secret source S , any j ∈ P , and any secret scheme, log |Xj |  log |S|. On the
other hand, one can always construct a secret sharing scheme with log |Xj |  c log |S| (for all j ∈ P)
for a constant c depending only on the access structure A but not on S (c. f. [8] or [14]). Usually we
want maxj∈P |Xj | to be as small as possible and call a scheme with minimum maxj∈P |Xj | optimal.
Thus for any given access structure there is a constant c such that for all S (and any secret source S on
it) and the optimal secret scheme for it,
log |S|  log |Xj |  c log |S|, (4)
for all j ∈ P .
302 N. Cai, K. Y. Lam / Information and Computation 184 (2003) 298–310
3. The Models and the Results
Before defining our new model, the identification secret sharing(IDSS) scheme formally, let us
consider an example. Suppose a company produces q kinds of products, which are labeled by
s = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1, and has J potential customers. The company wants to sell a kind of products
only when at least k customers intend to buy them. Otherwise for certain trade security reason, it even
does not want the customers to know what it is going to sell. For this purpose, the company can apply
a (k, J ) threshold secret scheme for the set S := {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} of secrets when it is going to sell a
kind of products labeled by s ∈ S. If l  k customers are interested in its products, they can pool
their shares and determine s, what the company is going to sell. However in the case that only l < k
customers intend to buy its products they have absolutely no idea about what it wants to sell even
when they cooperate by pooling their shares. Here we assume the customers have to pay for using
their sharing so that there is no reason for a customer who does not want to buy anything to
contribute his/her share. According to the scheme, the company (or the dealer) has to give each
potential customer (the participant) log q bits for the share. It may cost “a lot” when q is very large.
Can it be done better? The answer seems “certainly” to be negative since the scheme that it uses is
already optimal. However we notice that it often happens that a customer may be interested only in
one kind of its products but not in all of them. In other words the customers only want to “identify”
whether the products interesting for them will be sold and do not care what will be sold in the other
case. This leaves a room for us to improve the protocol. It is clear that in the case, that only l < k
customers would like to buy s0 ∈ S, those customers never have a chance to buy them and so they
can do nothing for their interests. In the case the number of customers interested in s0 is not less than
k they can identify whether s0 will be sold by the cooperation among them and do not need the
cooperation from the others. So we can assume only those who want to buy the same products may
cooperate. This example leads us to the following model.
Given a finite set S of secrets (the sets of the indices of the products in the example), a set P = [J ] of
participants (the potential customers in the example), an access structure A, or a collection of so-called
qualified subsets of P (the collection of subsets of the customers with sizes at least k in the example).
The dealer (the company in the example) chooses a conditional probability distribution over X J , a
cartesian product of a sequence of finite sets X1, . . . ,XJ , under the condition which s ∈ S is given. All
participants know the conditional distribution.
a) For given s ∈ S (, which the company wants to sell in the example), the dealer chooses a sequence
xJ := (x1, . . . , xJ ) ∈ X J according to the conditional distribution and gives the j th participant xj
as his/her share.
b) In the case that any qualified subset A ∈ A of participants want to know whether the secret s at
the dealer’s hands is a special s0 ∈ S, they can “identify” it by pooling their shares correctly with a
probability close to 1. (In the example, if at least k customers want to buy the s0th products, they can
check whether the company is going to sell them by pooling the shares which they received from the
company.)
c) s and s0 can be arbitrary secrets in S and the dealer (previously) has no idea about s0. (In the example
the company does not know what its customers want to buy.)
d) Any non-qualified subset of participants can obtain absolutely no information about the secret s at
the dealer’s hands. In particular they cannot identify whether it is a “special” s0 by pooling their
shares. (In the example if less k customers want to buy the same kind of products and cooperate to
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check whether the products are going to be sold or even try to obtain any information about what the
company want to sell, they will fail to do it.)
Let us now define our scheme, the identification secret sharing (IDSS) scheme. Again suppose we are
given a set P = [J ] of participants, an access structure A, and a secret source S, a RV taking values in
the set S of secrets. Then a (λ1, λ2) IDSS scheme is specified by a stochastic matrix W : S −→ X J (for
any sequence of finite sets Xj , j = 1, . . . , J ) and a collection of subsets of XA,A ∈ A which we called
decoding sets
D := {DAs : A ∈ A, s ∈ S} (5)
such that for all s ∈ S,
DAs ⊂ XA (6)
i′) for all A ∈ A and s, s′ ∈ S with
s = s′,
PXA|S(DAs |s)  1 − λ1, (7)
and
PXA|S(DAs |s′)  λ2, (8)
and condition ii) hold. λ1 and λ2 are called probabilities of errors of the first kind and second kind
respectively. The scheme works in a similar way. The dealer chooses the shares according to W(.|s) for
an s ∈ S (occurring with probability PS(s)) and distribute them to the participants. A qualified subset
of participants, who are interested in whether s is equal to a “special” element s0 in S, pool their shares
to obtain an xA ∈ XA and check whether xA falls on DAs0 . If so, they say “Yes(, the ‘s’ at dealer’s hands
is s0).” and otherwise they say “No(, it is not s0).” By (7), with probability not smaller than 1 − λ1 they
say “Yes” and with probability not larger than λ1 they make a mistake to say “No” when s = s0. (This
is known as the error of first kind in statistics.) By (8) they make a mistake to say “Yes” with probability
no larger than λ2 when s = s0. (It is known as the error of the second kind in statistics.)
Notice in an IDSS scheme the errors are allowed. Let us assume no error is allowed i.e., λ1 = λ2 =
0. Then by (7), DAs ⊃ supp(PXA|S(.|s)), for all A ∈ A, s ∈ S and (8) yields that for all A ∈ A, s =
s′,DAs ∩ supp(PXA|S(.|s′)) = ∅. So for an IDSS scheme whose probabilities of errors of both kinds are
zero, supp(PXA|S(.|s)), s ∈ S are pairwise disjoint for all A ∈ A and therefore the scheme actually is an
(ordinary) secret sharing scheme. So we always assume that at least one of λ1 and λ2 is not 0. However
as is usual in statistics and in other models of identification, we assume that an error of first kind is more
serious than that of the second kind. This assumption is reasonable. For example, in the above example
an error of the first kind makes the company and its customers lose a chance for trade. They probably
only waste time when an error of the second kind occurs. So we assume that λ1  0 and λ2 > 0. We shall
see whether λ1 is 0 asymptotically makes no difference. This suggests us to employ an IDSS scheme
with λ1 = 0 when the secret is sufficiently long.
For an IDSS scheme and an A ∈ A, DAs ’s are not necessarily pairwise disjoint. Consequently a quali-
fied subsetAmay identify s is s0 or s′0 if they receive an xA ∈ DAs0 ∩DAs′0 for different s0 and s
′
0. Of course
one of the identifications must be wrong but the probability to make wrong identification is always no
larger than λ1 + λ2. The decoding sets’ overlapping causes errors and so it seems to be a backward. But
without the overlapping the size |S| of the shared secrets could not exceed XA for all A ∈ A (in fact
we have known that |S|  |Xj | for all j ∈ P). We shall see that because of the overlapping, we identify
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secrets of double exponential sizes when the sizes of alphabets Xj exponentially increase. Paying a cost
of the errors for gaining much longer shared secrets is exactly the key idea for IDSS scheme. This is
similar to in the case of identification codes for the channels.
We shall also discuss the case when a public message is allowed. In this case the dealer is allowed
to broadcast a public message x0 from a finite set X0, the alphabet of the public messages, and ev-
ery participant in P receives not only his/her (private) share but also the public message. So instead
of a stochastic matrix W from S to X J the dealer uses a stochastic matrix W0 from S to (X n)0 :=
X n × X0 to choose shares. A subset A = {j1, . . . , jk} (say) of participants obtain a sequence (xA)0 :=
(xj1, . . . , xjk , x0) ∈ (XA)0 by pooling their shares. The decoding sets (DAs )0(∈ (XA)0 for A ∈ A, s ∈ S)
and the probabilities λ1 and λ2 of the errors of the first and the second kinds are defined analogously.
For A = {j1, . . . , jk}, the RV generated by an IDSS scheme with public message and the secret source
S is denoted by (XA)0 := (XA,X0) = (Xj1, . . . Xjk , X0) analogously.
For a given access structure A on a set P of participants, we denote by
a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ ) := min
A∈A
∏
j∈A
|Xj | (9)
The followings are our results:
Theorem 3.1.
1) For all  , λ2 > 0, there exists a sufficiently large L such that for all access structure A on all P, all
S with log log |S| > L and all X1, . . . ,XJ , with |Xj |  θj for j ∈ P, where θj , j ∈ P are constants
depending on λ2 and A and
log a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ ) > (log log |S|)(1 +  ), (10)
(where a(.) is defined in (9), ) there exists a (0, λ2) IDSS scheme (without public messages) with
alphabet (X1, . . . ,XJ ).
2) For all  , λ2 > 0, λ1  0 with λ1 + λ2 < 1, there exists a positive L such that for all access structure
A on any P and all S with log log |S| > L, there is no IDSS scheme (without public messages) with
alphabet (X1, . . . ,XJ ) such that
log a(A;X1, . . .XJ )) < (log log |S|)(1 −  ). (11)
Theorem 3.2.
1) For all  , λ2 > 0 there exist a positive number L such that for all access structure A on all P,
all S with log log |S| > L, and all (X1, . . . ,XJ ,X0) with |Xj | > θj , j ∈ P, where θj , j ∈ P are
constants depending on λ2 and A, and
log a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ )+ log |X0| > (log log |S|)(1 +  ), (12)
there exists a (0, λ2) IDSS scheme with public message and alphabet (X1, . . .XJ ,X0).
2) For all  , λ2 > 0, λ1  0 with λ1 + λ2 < 1 there exists a positive L such that for all access struc-
ture A and all S with log log |S| > L there is no IDSS scheme with public message and alphabet
(X1, . . . ,XJ ,X0) such that
logA(A,X1, . . . ,XJ )+ log |X0| < (log log |S|)(1 −  ). (13)
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By Theorem 3.2 1), for fixed access structure and fixed probability of the error of the second kind, one
can fix the sizes |Xj |, j ∈ P of (private) alphabets to identify a set of secrets with arbitrarily large size
by increasing the size of public alphabet. That means the majority of the message provided by the dealer
may be broadcasted. It follows from our observation that in the construction of IDSS scheme without
public message in Section 5 the majorities of the shares given to the participants can be broadcasted
publicly without changing the security. Thus a construction of IDSS with public message in Theorem
3.2 1) immediately follows.
Remark. Some readers might wonder why we say that the size of secrets grows double exponentially
while the share size grows exponentially instead of speaking that the size of secrets grows exponentially
while the share size grows up polynomially. The statement follows from the inequalities (10)–(13) in
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. By the following reasons we write (10) as
log a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ ) > (log log |S|)(1 +  )
instead
a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ ) > (log |S|)1+ 
and similarly to (11)–(13).
(1) In Theory of Communication and Computer Science people measure information in bits. So we
speak that the participant j receives log |Xj | bits of share but not say that he/she receives a share of
size |Xj |. In this way (10) in Theorem 3.1 says that a (0, λ2) IDSS scheme such that any qualified
set of participants receives totally more than log log |S|(1 +  ) bits of shares, always exists in the
case that the size of secrets is sufficiently large.
(2) The historical and consistent reason: Starting with in [2] and [3], in all references on identification
codes identified messages M are measured in “ rates” 1
n
log log |M| (, where n is the code length).
People in this area always speak of double exponential size of messages. To keep consistence, we
write double “log’s” at the right hand side of the inequality.
4. The Converses
In this section we show the converse parts of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 i.e., Theorem 3.1 2) and Theorem
3.2 2).
It is sufficient for us to show that for all  , δ > 0 there exists an L such that for any access structure
A and any secret source S with log log |S| > L, there exists a (λ1, λ2) IDSS scheme without public
message and with alphabet (X1, . . . ,XJ ) such that (11) holds or a (λ1, λ2) IDSS with public message
and alphabet (X1, . . . ,XJ ,X0) such that (13) holds implies that λ1 + λ2 > 1 − δ. Our proof is based on
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For all  , δ > 0 there exists an L such that for any access structure A and any secret
source S with log log |S| > L the followings hold. There exist s, s′ ∈ S with s′ = s such that for an
A ∈ A
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∑
xA∈XA
|PXA|S(xA|s)− PXA|S(xA|s′)| < 2δ (14)
if there is an IDSS scheme for S without public message such that (11) holds. There exist s, s′ ∈ S with
s′ = s such that for an A ∈ A∑
(xA)
0∈(XA)0
|P(XA)0|S((xA)0|s)− P(XA)0|S((xA)0|s′)| < 2δ (15)
if there is an IDSS scheme for S with public message such that (13) holds.
Proof. For a given IDSS scheme (with or without public message) we assume that A = {j1, . . . , jl}
(say) achieves a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ ) in (9). Let Xjl := {1, . . . , q} and QK(Xjl ) be the set of probabili-
ty distributions Q over Xjl with Q(j) = kK , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} for j = 1, . . . , q. Then a probability
distribution P over Xjl can be approximated by a probability distribution Q ∈ QK(Xjl ) in the sense
that for all x ∈ Xjl , |P(x)−Q(x)| < 1K . Indeed for given a such P one can find a Q as follows.
Choose k1 = KP(1) and Q(1) = k1K . Choose ki = KP(i) if
∑i−1
x=1[P(x)−Q(x)]  0 and oth-
erwise ki = KP(i) and let Q(i) = kiK , having chosen Q(1), . . . ,Q(i − 1). Thus |P(x)−Q(x)| <
1
K
for all x ∈ Xjl and |
∑q
x=1 P(x)−
∑q
x=1 Q(x)| < 1K , which and the definition of Q yield that∑q
x=1 Q(x) =
∑q
x=1 P(x) = 1. Therefore Q is a probability distribution.
Let b be a sufficiently large integer specified later and K := qb. Then |QK(Xjl )| is equal to the
number of the integer solutions of the system
∑q
k=1 zk = K, 0  zk, k = 1, . . . , q (for (z1, . . . , zq)),
and therefore
|QK(Xjl )| =
(
K + q − 1
q − 1
)
< 2K+q = 2q(b+1). (16)
Abbreviate A \ {jl} = {j1, . . . , jl−1} = A′. Then by the definitions of a(.) and A = {j1, . . . , jl} we
have
|XA′ | = q−1a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ ). (17)
Next, for all s ∈ S we approximate {PXjl |XA′S(.|xA′, s) : xA′ ∈ XA′ } by {Q(.|xA′, s) : xA′ ∈ XA′ } ∈
(QK(Xjl ))|XA′ | (, where (QK(Xjl ))|XA′ | := {(Q1, . . . ,Q|XA′ |) : Qi ∈ QK(Xjl )} is the |XA′ | dimension
cartesian power of QK(Xjl )) such that for all s ∈ S, x ∈ Xjl , and xA′ ∈ XA′ , |PXjl |XA′ (x|xA′, s)
−Q(x|xA′, s)| < 1K , or
∑
x∈Xjl
|PXjl |XA′ ,S(x|xA′, s)−Q(x|xA′, s)| < q
1
K
= 1
b
, (18)
as we have chosen K = bq. Now we assume that (11) holds and choose L sufficiently large such that
for all log log |S| > L,
log(b + 1)+ log log log |S|
log log |S| <  .
N. Cai, K. Y. Lam / Information and Computation 184 (2003) 298–310 307
Then (11) yields that
log log |S| > log a(A;Xj1, . . . ,Xjl )+ log(b + 1)+ log log log |S|
> log a(A;Xj1, . . . ,Xjl )+ log(b + 1)+ log log a(A;Xj1, . . . ,Xjl )= log[a(A;Xj1, . . . ,Xjl )(b + 1) log a(A;Xj1, . . . ,Xjl )]
Consequently, by (16) and (17) we have |S| > q(b+1)a(A;Xj1 ,...,Xjl ) > |QK(Xjl )||XA
′ |
, which implies that
there exist s, s′ ∈ S with s = s′ and Q(.|xA′, s) = Q(.|xA′, s′) for all xA′ ∈ XA′ . Thus, by (18), for all
xA′ ∈ XA′ ,∑
x∈Xjl
|PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s)− PXjj |XA′S(x|xA′, s′)|

∑
x∈Xjl
|PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s)−Q(x|xA′, s)| +
∑
x∈Xjl
|Q(x|xA′, s′)− PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s′)|
<
2
b
. (19)
On the other hand, by the definition of a(.) in (9), A′ /∈ A and therefore (2) holds for A′. In other
words, for all s ∈ S, PXA′ |S(.|s) = PXA′ (.). Thus for the pair of secrets s, s′ in (19),∑
xA∈XA
|PXA|S(xA|s)− PXA|S(xA|s′)|
=
∑
xA′∈XA′
∑
x∈Xjl
|PXA′ |S(xA′ |s)PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s)− PXA′ |S(xA′ |s′)PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s′)|
=
∑
xA′∈XA′
PXA′ (xA′)
∑
x∈Xjl
|PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s)− PXjl |XA′S(x|xA′, s′)|
<
∑
xA′∈XA′
PXA′ (xA′)
2
b
= 2
b
. (20)
Finally we choose b  1
δ
and then (14) follows. Similarly we can show (15). So the lemma is proven.
We are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 3.1 2), by (14) we have
λ1 + λ2 > 1 − PXA|S(DAs |s)+ PXA|S(DAs |s′)
 1 − max
D⊂XA
(PXA|S(D|s)− PXA|S(D|s′))
= 1 −
∑
xA:PXA|S(xA|s)PXA|S(xA|s′)
(PXA|S(xA|s)− PXA|S(xA|s′))
= 1 − 1
2
∑
xA∈XA
|PXA|S(xA|s)− PXA|S(xA|s′)| > 1 − δ.
Thus the proof of Theorem 3.1 2) is completed. 
One can show Theorem 3.2 2) in the same way but by using (15) instead of (14).
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5. Constructions
In this section, we present a constructive proof for the direct part, Theorem 3.1 1) through the well-
known Gilbert-Varshamov bound in coding theory. An IDSS scheme with public message can be ob-
tained by a slight modification from the IDSS scheme without public message. Therefore Theorem
3.2 1) is obtained as well. Let Z := {0, . . . , q − 1} and denote the Hamming distance between zn :=
(z1, . . . , zn), z′n := (z′1, . . . , z′n) ∈ Zn by dH (zn, z′n) := |{j : zj = z′j }|. A code over Zn is a subset of
Zn.
Theorem 5.1. (Gilbert-Varshamov Bound): For all positive integers d < n, there exists a code C ⊂
Zn of size |C| = M, such that for all zn, z′n ∈ C, dH (zn, z′n) > d (we say that the code has minimum
(Hamming) distance larger than d) if M is an integer satisfying
M <
qn∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i . (21)
Let us first describe the idea for the construction before presenting it formally. We first choose prop-
erly n, q, and d such that d
n
sufficiently close to 1 (depending on λ2) and there exists a code over
Zn := {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}n with minimum Hamming distance larger than d and size |S| by the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound. Then we map the secrets in S to the code by a bijector φ. All participants (including
the dealer) know the code and φ. For a given s ∈ S, the dealer randomly chooses an i ∈ [n] with uniform
distribution and then distributes the shares to the participants such that all qualified subsets can recover
(i, ci) if φ(s) = (c1, . . . cn). After recovering (i, ci) the members of a qualified subset, who want to
identify if s = s0 for an s0 with φ(s0) = (c01, . . . , c0n), check whether ci = c0i . They say “Yes” if so and
otherwise say “No”. So the probability of the first kind is zero. On the other hand, the Hamming distance
dH (φ(s), φ(s0)) > d is sufficiently close to n and therefore the dealer chooses an i with probability
sufficiently close to 1 such that ci = c0i if s = s0. This implies the probability of the error of second
kind is sufficiently close to zero since an error of the second kind occurs exactly when s = s0 and the
dealer chooses an i with ci = c0i . This idea was first used in [3] to construct an identification code for
a channel with feedback. Our observation is that the i chosen by the dealer can be publicly informed to
the participants (and only ci needs to be kept in secret). So the dealer may broadcast it when the public
message is allowed. In the other case, he just informs it to the qualified sets via their shares but it is not
necessary to keep it in secret from non-qualified subsets. The only part needed to be kept in secret is ci ,
which can be “sent” to qualified subsets by an (ordinary) secret sharing scheme. This makes us identify
more secrets. We shall first construct a scheme and then show that it is an IDSS scheme satisfying the
conditions of the theorem.
To construct the scheme, we first set up the parameters n, d, and q such that the desired code exists.
For a given λ2, let us fix 0 < µ < λ2 and α > 1. Choose an integer q such that
qµ
2
 α. (22)
For a sufficiently large integer n (specified later) we choose a set S with cardinality
|S| = α
n
n
 (23)
and an integer d with µ  1 − d
n
< λ2. Since by (22) we have that
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|S|  α
n
n

qnµ
n2n
= q
n
n2nqn(1−µ)

qn
n2nqd
<
qn∑d
i=0 2nqi
<
qn∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i ,
by Gilbert-Varshamov bound, one can find a codeC with minimum distance larger than d and cardinality
|C| = |S| and therefore a bijector φ from S to C. The code and φ are known by the dealer and all
participants in P .
The dealer generates a RV U taking values in [n] uniformly and distributes a share xj := (x′j , x′′j )
to the j th participant in P so that all qualified subsets can reconstruct (U, cU) and all non-qualified
subsets have no knowledge about cU for a given s ∈ S with φ(s) = (c1, . . . , cn) (say). For an IDSS
scheme without public message the dealer has to inform the qualified subsets the value of U through
their (private) shares and he does it by the parts x′j of the shares. For an IDSS with public message he
does it through associating the public message x0 ∈ X0 and the shares x′j when the size |X0| of public
message is not sufficiently large (i. e., smaller than n) and otherwise through the public message (in
this case the component x′j in xj is not necessary). Notice that we do not ask to keep the value of U in
secret (from the non-qualified subsets). It can be sent in a public way. We only present the construction
of IDSS schemes without public message. An IDSS schemes with public message can be obtained by a
modification in an obvious way and we leave the details to the readers. Let |A| = I and denote by
A = {Ai : i = 1, . . . , I }. (24)
Because I and c in (4) are fixed for given A, and by (23) log n < (log log |S|)(1 +  4) if |S| is suffi-
ciently large, for any collection (X1, . . . ,XJ ) of alphabets satisfying the conditions in Theorem 3.1 1),
one can express Xj ’s (or their subsets) as X ′j I × X ′′j , where X ′j I is the I dimension cartesian power of
X ′j and X ′′j is a finite set with |X ′′j | = qc for c in (4) such that
log a(A;X ′1, . . . ,X ′J ) > (log n)
(
1 +  
4
)
, (25)
since by (9), (for X = X ′j I × X ′′) log a(A;X1, . . . ,XJ )  log a(A;X ′1I , . . . ,X ′J I )+ maxA⊂A
log
∏
i∈A |X ′′i | = log a(A;X ′1, . . . ,X ′J )+ log I + maxA⊂A log
∏
i∈A |X ′′i | and
log |X ′′j | = c log q, (26)
for c in (4). For each j, x′j is a sequence in X ′Ij defined as follows. For Ai, i = 1, . . . , I = |A| (please
c. f. (24)) we partition ∏j∈Ai X ′j into n subsets of (nearly) equal sizes. Notice that by (25) the par-
tition exists. The dealer chooses a sequence from the uth subset randomly and uniformly and gives
its component in X ′j to participant j ∈ Ai as the ith component of x′j if U = u(∈ [n]). The dealer
arbitrarily chooses a letter in X ′j and gives it to j ∈ Ai as the ith component of x′j . Thus for all Ai , the
members j ∈ Ai can recover the sequence chosen by the dealer for Ai by pooling the ith components of
x′j , j ∈ Ai . So they know which subset the sequence falls on and therefore learn u, the value of RV U .
Denote the introduced RV’s by X′j , j ∈ P . Then by the construction, X′j , j ∈ P are independent of S
because they only depend on U and U is independent of S.
Next by (26) there exits a secret sharing scheme for the secret set Z := {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} with the al-
phabets (X ′′1 , . . . ,X ′′J ). Thus in the case, that S = s and U = u, the dealer chooses the shares x′′j , j ∈ P
for the secret s′′ = cu(∈ Z), where φ(s) = (c1, . . . , cn), such that the qualified subsets are able to recov-
er cu and non-qualified subsets have no knowledge about cu. Denote the corresponding RV’s by S′′ and
X′′j , j ∈ P and (analogously X′′A,A ⊂ P). Since (X′J S, S′′, X′′J ) forms a Markov chain and for A ∈
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A, S′′ is independent of X′′A, for non-qualified A, X′′A is independent of X′J S. On the other hand S and
X′J are independent. So (X′′A,X′J , S) is an independent triple. Consequently XA = (X′AX′′A) and S are
independent ifA ∈ A i.e., (2) or the condition ii) holds. We notice here that forA /∈ A, H(S|X′′A,X′J ) =
H(S) since X′′A,X′J , S are independent. This means a non-qualified subset cannot obtain any infor-
mation about the secret even if they know the value of X′J . In other words, the dealer can inform the
participants x′J , the value of RV X′J publicly and this gives a construction of IDSS with public message.
We leave the details to the readers. Finally we have to define the decoding sets DAs for all A ∈ A and
s ∈ S, and to show (7) (for λ1 = 0) and (8). For fixed A ∈ A, s ∈ S the decoding set DAs is defined as
follows. Notice that for all A ∈ A the ith component of the value x′A of X′A falls on the uth subset for all
i iff U = u. In this case, we say that x′A falls on the uth subset of X ′A. Let x′A fall on the uth subset of
X ′A and φ(s) = (c1, . . . , cn). Then xA = (x′A, x′′A) ∈ DAs iff the secret s′′ recovered by A via x′′A in the
secret sharing scheme for S′′ is cu. Since A can recover cu(= s′′) without error,
PXA|S(DAs |s) = 1, (27)
i. e., (7) hold for λ1 = 0. Moreover XA falls on DAs ∩DAs′ for A ∈ A, s = s′ iff x′A falls on a subset, say
the uth subset such that φ(s) and φ(s′) have the same component at the uth coordinate and the dealer
chooses U = u. This with (27) yields that PXA|S(DAs |s′) = PXA|S(DAs ∩DAs′ |s′)  1 − dn < λ2, i.e. (8)
holds.
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